President Trump’s National Security Strategy, unveiled this week, paints a picture of a world defined by volatility and little incentive for cooperation among the US, China, and Russia. In many regards, the world has gone nuts and it may seem advantageous to retreat to the corners and hunker down. However, America must ensure strength and resilience at home while simultaneously engaging all elements of national power abroad. This administration is struggling to put teeth into a foreign policy philosophy that often seems pitted against itself. President Trump’s National Security Strategy must offer a prescriptive solution: focus on home and abroad. Our current challenges in Turkey may prove instructive to this policy’s implementation.
The Trump Administration’s announcement this month to move the American Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, not surprisingly, spurred global protest. The Palestinian Authority’s demand for “three days of rage” had a very short fuse and the rest of the Muslim world has essentially remained quiet. However, America’s NATO ally, Turkey, admonished the decision and threatened to cut ties with Israel. Compared to other nations with a strong interest in the decision, Turkey’s reaction was a tad over-the-top strident. It is one of many disagreements in a growing divide between Turkey and the West.
A quick history: Turkey joined NATO in 1952. At the time, its inclusion in the alliance served as a deterrent to Soviet expansion and was applauded for its practical incorporation of a secular Turkey in the West. What was intended then as a geographic buffer has today assumed its ancient relevance as a gateway across the Bosphorus. Turkey’s position as the bridge from Asia to Europe invites the spiraling chaos of the Middle East, especially Syria, to migrate and affect the West fundamentally.
Current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vision for his country, a traditionally liberal, Muslim society, lauds Islamic uprisings in the region as a “grand restoration” of Islamic civilization. A campaign to establish Turkish influence and prominence has yielded an increasingly autocratic presidency and, alarmingly, warm relations with its traditional foes, Russia and Iran. In an increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world we should not be surprised, but we are.
The United States has traditionally enjoyed a close and dynamic alliance with Turkey, one the United States has taken for granted over the years. Our relationship has always been a critical contributor to US and NATO military and intelligence requirements in the region. However, in recent years, tensions have escalated. The United States hoped to open a northern flank of attack from Turkey into Iraq in the 2003 invasion. To Washington’s surprise, Ankara refused to allow US ground forces on its soil. As a result, the United States has had to adjust its posture in its fight against ISIS and countering Russian recidivism, like the world witnessed in the Crimea. Although intact, the alliance with Turkey continues to atrophy.
Accelerating America’s “Turkey problem” was the 2016 attempted military-led coup. Erdoğan claimed the coup was inspired and planned by Turkish businessman and cleric Fethullah Gulen, who lives in the United States. The US refused to extradite him. However, President Trump, in a nod to Erdoğan, announced that the US would stop arming Kurdish fighters in Syria, a group Turkey considers a terrorist organization; but, it is one the US sees as helpful in its campaign against ISIS. It’s a mess.
One of the most alarming shifts in the region is the burgeoning relationship between Erdoğan and Putin. Despite centuries of conflict and the 2015 downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish forces near the Syria-Turkey border, the overall trajectory of the Turkish-Russian relationship has every appearance of collaboration. This developing alliance is reinforced by mutually beneficial investments in defense, energy, and ideology.
Defense: In September, Turkey rejected NATO warnings and secured a deal to purchase S-400 air defense missiles from Russia. While NATO does not prohibit the procurement of weapon systems or military hardware from manufacturers outside the alliance, it clearly discourages members from buying equipment that is not compatible with existing capabilities. This was anything but a subtle jab at NATO.
This unapproved acquisition will likely not be Turkey’s only step toward a decision to withdrawal from NATO’s military structure (not unlike France’s decision in 1966 to withdraw its troops from the alliance). Although NATO deployed US Patriot missiles to Turkey as tensions rose in neighboring Syria, Erdoğan’s insistence on having an autonomous defense capability stems from his mistrust of the West. His paranoia is unsubstantiated, and his actions are proving harmful to the alliance.
Energy: The modern progress of Russian-Turkish relations is driven by a deep and diverse economic connection. From 2002-2013, bi-lateral trade between Turkey and Russia increased fivefold. Russia already serves as the primary provider of natural gas to Europe, with Turkey importing more than 50% of its natural gas requirements from Russia. Additionally, in 2010, Erdoğan awarded a $20 billion contract to the Russian- owned energy corporation, Rosatom, which has been commissioned to construct the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey. There is little reason to assume the economic interest between Russia and Turkey will not grow.
Ideology: Beyond the economic and military ties shared by the two nations, Putin and Erdoğan share a similar leadership philosophy that fundamentally challenges the West. Several rebuffed attempts to become better integrated into European and American policies in the past decade have left both leaders resolved to directly confront Western influence. Their relationship is not without discord; but where they are aligned, NATO’s interests are at risk.
The Take Away: As the partnership between Turkey and Russia continues to flourish, the future of Turkey’s position in NATO is increasingly precarious. In a recent poll, 60% of the Academy Securities Geopolitical Advisory Board believe Turkey will withdraw from NATO in 2018. NATO’s relevance is as evident today as it was at its inception, but Turkey’s relevance to NATO seems shaky.
Ankara’s increasing infatuation with Moscow is problematic for the United States, since Turkey’s embrace of sectarian radicalism and Russian autocracy is diametrically opposed to Western democratic values. However, Washington must be willing to compromise to ensure Turkey’s continued participation as a full and trusted member of NATO.
In this conflict lies opportunity. Russian influence in the Middle East is not explicitly negative. The US can and will cooperate with Russia in the region, as it is not in our interest to lose NATO’s southern flank by pushing Ankara into Moscow’s arms.
Ultimately, NATO’s survival is not dependent on Turkey’s membership. Although the disconcerting alliance between Turkey and Russia is strengthening, it remains tenuous. If the US is to have any hope of retaining this Middle Eastern and NATO ally, now is the time for Washington to incentivize, encourage, and remind Ankara that its interests are best served in the democratic sphere. If the Trump Administration can accomplish this, it will be a firm step in validating its National Security Strategy.