The administration of President Trump is picking up speed in its First 100 Days and, as advertised, campaigned, and promised, a lot is happening by way of executive order and legislative policy priority. The top priority issues are not a surprise: create an energy plan, focus on foreign policy, create job growth, strengthen our military, support law enforcement, and establish trade deals favorable to America.
In the past ten days, the White House has issued executive orders in each of these areas to create the necessary momentum to affect the change the President has said he needs in order to “make America great again.” Campaign promises and election results should be adhered to I think we would all agree to that. The American people elected a candidate who indicated that he’d alter the course of our country domestically and internationally. It’s a tall order, but it’s how he was elected and we should not be surprised by his swift and decisive actions.
Not surprisingly, America has spoken as there are unintended consequences to each. Not only are American citizens nervous and, in some cases, boisterous about these executive declarations, there are reactions that we must be prepared for internationally. Inconceivable as it may seem, consider the following: Could we have another ground war in Europe?
Since the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we’ve prepared for the eventuality of ground combat in Europe. Why shouldn’t we? In the arc of less than 30 years, Germany’s adventurism, exploitation, and butchery of its neighbors were the norm. Europe planned for the best and was unprepared for the worst. Two generations of European youth suffered unimaginable horrors and lost faith in their neighbor’s intentions.
After World War II, NATO provided for the common defense of Europe. This effort was led by American values, goodwill, and extreme military capacity to counter the Soviet threat of military and economic intrusion and coercion. It worked. For the next 67 years following the end of World War II, Europe had been at peace. The Balkan crisis of the mid 90’s revealed the worst case of European recidivism, but total collapse of a united Europe was averted.
What’s next for Europe? International attention, resources, and commitment for the past 20 years have been laser focused on challenges of radical Islamic terrorism. It’s a scourge that has its roots in the Middle East but affects all geographies with its ideology of barbarism and loose interpretation of the Koran to suit extremist views. It’s cynical yet effective.
While the world has paid almost exclusive attention to attacking radical Islam, trying to deal with the aftershocks of missed opportunities and an inability to abort or limit its reach, cracks in our common defense have surfaced.
An open and free Europe Union (EU) is rightfully challenged. BREXIT, the United Kingdom’s populist decision to exit the EU, was the first step of many that will follow. What has been an open Europe defined by a common history and currency is now at risk. Gates have replaced bridges. Refugees wait for months or longer for admission to the EU. Camps in northern Greece grow in
size and squalor. Syria’s largest export is its people.
The chaos in the Middle East and North Africa has propelled refugee migration levels to numbers not seen since the end of World War II. Not unlike the period following World War II, tolerance and understanding for the human condition of the displaced and disadvantaged are in short supply. Europe is a mess; BREXIT was the logical result of an island nation tired of dealing with the in-exactitude of policies not aligned with their national best interest.
The Russian Federation, meanwhile, is taking a century’s-long view and behaves not dissimilarly to Czarist Russia. Crises elsewhere distract the world’s attention while Russia marches forward to ensure its place as a world power. The Romanovs have been replaced by Vladimir Putin, but he won’t suffer a similar fate.
Most assuredly, Russia has its host of problems, including a fledgling economy, but its national prestige has never been more robust and its leader more revered. A bare-chested Putin rides a horse and it’s followed by fireworks, a national celebration, and a media campaign. Putin knows exactly who and what he’s feeding: the nationalistic pride of the Russian people and the fears of Russia’s neighbors, both near and afar (i.e., the EU).
The EU and the United States have been distracted. We’ve been fighting extreme Islamic radicals who have a singular mission to destroy western modernism. It doesn’t matter what we do; these radicals want us dead. Hence, we’ve been busy. The window of opportunity was opened. Russia walked through.
Russia annexed Crimea with ground troops and we watched. Russia attacked the Syrian resistance with fighter aircraft and we watched. Russia attacked our Presidential election via cyber-tactics and we watched. Russia says it’s acting in its own national self-interest, but Moscow’s bad behavior is reinforced by our acquiescence. Russia can and will do what it wants while will watch.
Maybe not. Russian adventurism may be stopped. The Trump administration wants to improve relations with Russia, but we cannot tolerate this behavior. President Putin does not have a preexisting relationship with President Trump, so the choreography of their diplomatic dance has not yet been set in determining acceptable standards of conduct.
Who leads and who follows? Who tests the limits of tolerable behavior? These are unknowns with these two international leaders. It’s not outside the realm of the possible to see a provocative move by Russia in the Baltics or an increase in military undertaking in Syria to spark a series of events on the ground that neither the U.S. nor Russia are in a position to modify or mitigate.
It’s not unrealistic to assume Russian intervention in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Kaliningrad is a port city in Russia, but it is cut off and geographically isolated from the rest of the federation by Lithuania and Poland. The Baltic states have the largest Russian-speaking populations of all NATO countries and share a common border with Russia. Direct land access to Kaliningrad is governed by treaty, but remains a clear and present irritant to Moscow.
We should not be surprised to see another “Crimealike” “soft invasion” by Russia in order to protect “ethnic Russians” outside the federation. Soldiers and special operators dressed in mufti one day, could suddenly appear in uniform the next once across the border into the Baltic states. That is exactly how Putin invaded Crimea three years ago.
The difference between what happened in the Ukraine and this possible scenario is stark. Unlike the Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO. Article V of the NATO charter stipulates that an attack, regardless of how it’s executed, on one NATO member is an attack on all. The taking of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, is the equivalent of an attack on Munich or Tampa or Milan. NATO would immediately be involved to forcibly remove Russian troops.
I’ve been trained my entire life to rely little on hope and to plan for the worst possible outcome. This would be the worst possible outcome, but I sure would be looking for a nice inventory of hope. Russia would claim sovereign rights to protect its “citizens” on its near border. Their actions would be swift, precise, and, very possibly, virtually nonlethal. It would be over before the first alert of an incursion or a demand to invoke Article V of the NATO charter could be executed.
So, what happens then? Article V would guide and govern NATO’s actions. The treaty’s teeth have never really been stressed; this would stress every aspect of NATO and European solidarity. Most assuredly, military action would follow. Europe would be at war again, and America would be involved deeply, inexorably, and making the necessary sacrifices that our international partners expect of American leadership.
No one wants this. All would lose…a provocative Russia, a European Union struggling with its identity, and a NATO alliance exhausted after 15 years of combat in the Middle East. It is, however, a real possibility.
Our new administration, we must assume, is no doubt engaged in the necessary planning to anticipate this possibility and is creating the engagement steps to build trust among the Russian Federation, our European allies, and ourselves. We should all ask to know what those steps are. How can we contribute to them? How can we measure their success?
Hope, most assuredly, is not a methodology to achieve success. We can hope that Russia will not use “ethnic minority” grievances in the Baltics as a pretext to an invasion, but we will plan otherwise. In this case, we will conduct exhaustive, pressure-tested planning, but hope must be present as well and in equal supply.