Month: December 2017

Turkey’s Future

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President Trump’s National Security Strategy, unveiled this week, paints a picture of a world defined by volatility and little incentive for cooperation among the US, China, and Russia. In many regards, the world has gone nuts and it may seem advantageous to retreat to the corners and hunker down. However, America must ensure strength and resilience at home while simultaneously engaging all elements of national power abroad. This administration is struggling to put teeth into a foreign policy philosophy that often seems pitted against itself. President Trump’s National Security Strategy must offer a prescriptive solution: focus on home and abroad. Our current challenges in Turkey may prove instructive to this policy’s implementation.
 
The Trump Administration’s announcement this month to move the American Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, not surprisingly, spurred global protest. The Palestinian Authority’s demand for “three days of rage” had a very short fuse and the rest of the Muslim world has essentially remained quiet. However, America’s NATO ally, Turkey, admonished the decision and threatened to cut ties with Israel. Compared to other nations with a strong interest in the decision, Turkey’s reaction was a tad over-the-top strident. It is one of many disagreements in a growing divide between Turkey and the West.
 
A quick history: Turkey joined NATO in 1952. At the time, its inclusion in the alliance served as a deterrent to Soviet expansion and was applauded for its practical incorporation of a secular Turkey in the West. What was intended then as a geographic buffer has today assumed its ancient relevance as a gateway across the Bosphorus. Turkey’s position as the bridge from Asia to Europe invites the spiraling chaos of the Middle East, especially Syria, to migrate and affect the West fundamentally.
 
Current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vision for his country, a traditionally liberal, Muslim society, lauds Islamic uprisings in the region as a “grand restoration” of Islamic civilization. A campaign to establish Turkish influence and prominence has yielded an increasingly autocratic presidency and, alarmingly, warm relations with its traditional foes, Russia and Iran. In an increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world we should not be surprised, but we are.
 
The United States has traditionally enjoyed a close and dynamic alliance with Turkey, one the United States has taken for granted over the years. Our relationship has always been a critical contributor to US and NATO military and intelligence requirements in the region. However, in recent years, tensions have escalated. The United States hoped to open a northern flank of attack from Turkey into Iraq in the 2003 invasion. To Washington’s surprise, Ankara refused to allow US ground forces on its soil. As a result, the United States has had to adjust its posture in its fight against ISIS and countering Russian recidivism, like the world witnessed in the Crimea. Although intact, the alliance with Turkey continues to atrophy.
 
Accelerating America’s “Turkey problem” was the 2016 attempted military-led coup. Erdoğan claimed the coup was inspired and planned by Turkish businessman and cleric Fethullah Gulen, who lives in the United States. The US refused to extradite him. However, President Trump, in a nod to Erdoğan, announced that the US would stop arming Kurdish fighters in Syria, a group Turkey considers a terrorist organization; but, it is one the US sees as helpful in its campaign against ISIS. It’s a mess.
 
One of the most alarming shifts in the region is the burgeoning relationship between Erdoğan and Putin. Despite centuries of conflict and the 2015 downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish forces near the Syria-Turkey border, the overall trajectory of the Turkish-Russian relationship has every appearance of collaboration. This developing alliance is reinforced by mutually beneficial investments in defense, energy, and ideology.
 
Defense: In September, Turkey rejected NATO warnings and secured a deal to purchase S-400 air defense missiles from Russia. While NATO does not prohibit the procurement of weapon systems or military hardware from manufacturers outside the alliance, it clearly discourages members from buying equipment that is not compatible with existing capabilities. This was anything but a subtle jab at NATO.
 
This unapproved acquisition will likely not be Turkey’s only step toward a decision to withdrawal from NATO’s military structure (not unlike France’s decision in 1966 to withdraw its troops from the alliance). Although NATO deployed US Patriot missiles to Turkey as tensions rose in neighboring Syria, Erdoğan’s insistence on having an autonomous defense capability stems from his mistrust of the West. His paranoia is unsubstantiated, and his actions are proving harmful to the alliance.
 
Energy: The modern progress of Russian-Turkish relations is driven by a deep and diverse economic connection. From 2002-2013, bi-lateral trade between Turkey and Russia increased fivefold. Russia already serves as the primary provider of natural gas to Europe, with Turkey importing more than 50% of its natural gas requirements from Russia. Additionally, in 2010, Erdoğan awarded a $20 billion contract to the Russian- owned energy corporation, Rosatom, which has been commissioned to construct the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey. There is little reason to assume the economic interest between Russia and Turkey will not grow.
 
Ideology: Beyond the economic and military ties shared by the two nations, Putin and Erdoğan share a similar leadership philosophy that fundamentally challenges the West. Several rebuffed attempts to become better integrated into European and American policies in the past decade have left both leaders resolved to directly confront Western influence. Their relationship is not without discord; but where they are aligned, NATO’s interests are at risk.
 
The Take Away: As the partnership between Turkey and Russia continues to flourish, the future of Turkey’s position in NATO is increasingly precarious. In a recent poll, 60% of the Academy Securities Geopolitical Advisory Board believe Turkey will withdraw from NATO in 2018. NATO’s relevance is as evident today as it was at its inception, but Turkey’s relevance to NATO seems shaky.
 
Ankara’s increasing infatuation with Moscow is problematic for the United States, since Turkey’s embrace of sectarian radicalism and Russian autocracy is diametrically opposed to Western democratic values. However, Washington must be willing to compromise to ensure Turkey’s continued participation as a full and trusted member of NATO.
 
In this conflict lies opportunity. Russian influence in the Middle East is not explicitly negative. The US can and will cooperate with Russia in the region, as it is not in our interest to lose NATO’s southern flank by pushing Ankara into Moscow’s arms.
 
Ultimately, NATO’s survival is not dependent on Turkey’s membership. Although the disconcerting alliance between Turkey and Russia is strengthening, it remains tenuous. If the US is to have any hope of retaining this Middle Eastern and NATO ally, now is the time for Washington to incentivize, encourage, and remind Ankara that its interests are best served in the democratic sphere. If the Trump Administration can accomplish this, it will be a firm step in validating its National Security Strategy.

The North Korean Thistle

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It’s fair to say that the situation on the Korean peninsula will not become a “back burner” issue as we move into 2018. In fact, we should not want to wish this challenge away. There is too much at risk, like a nuclear conflagration or a conventional war on the peninsula. As we approach this administration’s first anniversary, it appears America’s first diplomat, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, may be on his way out. That alone does not make the drumbeat of war any louder, but it certainly can distract from what is a formidable dilemma.
 
My West Texas mother reminded me daily, “If you see a thistle, grasp it firmly.” My siblings and I never really knew what she meant, but like most knuckleheads, we finally figured it out the hard way. “Life ain’t fair; things are tough; make your bed and don’t whine”. This daughter of the Depression knew what she was talking about; she’d lived it. Solve problems…especially the thorniest among them. Don’t wait. Embrace the madness even if it hurts.
 
Well, North Korea is the thorniest among a pretty significant inventory of global challenges. Almost any solution to this problem will hurt. However, this is the moment to grasp the North Korean “thistle.”
 
The following are the twelve realities that must be acknowledged as we lead the international community toward a solution, albeit not ideal, on the peninsula. Be warned, since it is the holiday season, there may be a similarity between this analysis and the 12 Days of Christmas. Fight the urge to sing along.
 
1.    One Korea. This is an aspirational ideal for both the South and the North. However, the realities of a separated Korea for over 70 years make its realization unlikely. We must live with two Koreas.
2.    Two months until the Winter Olympics. If not already, the world will be focusing on Korea this February. The Republic of Korea (ROK) hosted the Summer Olympics in 1988 without incident. The same will happen this year. However, three decades ago, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) did not have nukes and ICBMs and its leader, Kim Il Sung, was hardened and measured by war. He understood its realities. The current Kim is a perfumed prince, a man of luxuries and boundless vitriol. The Olympics embrace the struggle, not the victory. I’m not certain the younger Kim understands this sentiment.
3.    Three ICBM tests. Since this July, North Korea has conducted three ICBM missile tests. All were successful and demonstrated a capability to strike the United States. North Korea can terrorize with ICBMs but they can’t fight and win with them.
4.    Four other countries with a dog in this figurative fight. The standoff between the US and North Korea also includes China, Russia, Japan, and, of course, South Korea. We tend to personalize the animus between Kim and President Trump.  The path toward a solution includes, but is not limited to, these four very interested parties.
5.    Five years until the next ROK Presidential election. President Moon Jae-in has five years to fashion his vision for security and normalcy on the peninsula. He entered office with a liberal bias toward cooperation with the North. The realities of governing have taught him caution.
6.    Six nuclear tests. Since 2006, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests ranging from a yield of 2 kilotons to 250 kilotons. The most recent test was assessed to be a hydrogen bomb. Expect another test, probably above ground, before the Olympics.
7.    Seven months for North Korea to reach nuclear weaponization. The intelligence community (IC) was surprised by the accelerated pace of North Korean nuke and missiles development. Weaponization, the far more precise challenge of the miniaturization and marrying of a bomb to a missile, is imminent. Frankly, it is already past time for the IC to declare North Korea a nuclear-capable state and demand it act accordingly.
8.    Eight loose nukes. North Korea is highest on the list of consumers on the nuclear black market. The other routine participants in this marketplace are Libya, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Eastern European nations, and non-state actors like ISIS and Al Qaeda. Based on the current rate of development, North Korea will soon become a net exporter of nuclear technology.
9.    Nine major incidents. Over the years, North Korea has attempted to provoke the South into an escalation of violence. Every time, the US and South Korean forces acted with restraint and resolve, de-escalating what could have become the spark for war. The incidents include an unsuccessful but deadly commando raid by North Korean special forces in 1968 on the Blue House (the executive office and ROK’s presidential residence). An attack and capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968. In 1976, the axe murders of two US Army officers by North Korean soldiers in the Joint Security Area along the DMZ. A number of military engagements to include firefights, helicopter incidents, the exchange of artillery fire, and most recently the defection of a North Korean soldier earlier this month. This is expected behavior from the North. Lives are routinely at great risk.
10.    Ten million people live in Seoul. Every citizen of Seoul lives within the range of North Korean rockets and artillery. If war starts, tens of thousands will be killed.  This is an inevitable outcome of war on the peninsula. The Greater Seoul metropolitan area is home to more than 25 million people. To North Korea, this is where the targets are.
11.    Eleventh largest GDP. South Korea is an Asian economic miracle. The area from the DMZ to just south of Seoul, which is the historical invasion route from the North into Seoul, is a corridor of vibrancy, energy, commercial growth, and modern business parks. For those of us who have spent a good deal of our adult lives in Asia, South Korea’s growth is staggering. War would flatten all of this.
12.    Twelve years of North Korean nuclear research and development. By next year, North Korea will no longer be a novice at nuclear development and armament. They will have acquired the knowledge to strengthen and harden their development processes and will be deeply experienced in the black market of nuclear trade. It is alarming to think that multiple US presidential administrations have allowed this to happen. It now rests squarely on the top of this administration’s shoulders and can no longer be neglected.
 
This will be the year of decision vis-à-vis North Korea. Our President has said, “we will handle it; it will be handled.” I believe him. I’m just not sure what that means.
 
If the US seeks to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear and missile technology sometime in 2018, it will be by force. I’d like to hope the US can avoid this outcome, but war is the one guarantee that North Korea will not have nukes and will not be in a position to threaten the world. I could play out the scenarios in detail. However, there are only two details of importance: North Korea will not have nukes, and large portions of the peninsula will be a bloody mess.
 
Whether the Kim regime survives is irrelevant. China wants Kim or a Kim-like buffer between itself and South Korea. The US can live with that; we have for 70 years. We can extend that lease. But this contract will have a non-nuke clause!
 
Should the US agree to accept a nuclearized North Korea, then expect a flurry of international diplomatic efforts. First among those should be “to encourage” (not sure how “to force”) North Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols of inspections. This must be step one. Like any treaty, the NPT is only as good as its compliance and enforcement arms. Inarguably, no nation has ever been able to modify North Korean behavior. Sadly, we’ve never seen North Korea self-regulate or act with any restraint. But this is the challenge of diplomacy. The world would have to “hope” North Korea chooses to behave, though hope is not a real strategy.
 
A nuclearized North Korea will be a different North Korea, and Kim knows it. He would be in a far more precarious position. With nukes, he has limited options. Having nukes is his security; using nukes is his death sentence.
 
How we choose to “grasp the thistle” is ours to decide. Kim, on the other hand, will soon be the dog that just caught the bus. What now?

Middle East Tension

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In recent weeks, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been the subject of numerous headlines with a series of maneuvers to strengthen control and dominance in the region. The man behind the wheel, Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), whose national authority has advanced at an unprecedented rate, has vowed to transform the kingdom into modernity. Last week, KSA (along with Kuwait) advised their citizens to leave Lebanon immediately. These announcements came within days of an attempted Houthis missile strike on Riyadh and the unexpected resignation of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri. Most Recently, KSA co-sponsored a UN resolution with Israel, pointing to evolving alliances in the region amid growing Saudi-Iran tensions. This week, in a demonstration of support, Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Qatar. The economic isolation of Qatar by its fellow Arab states threatens the already tenuous coalition of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Saudi Arabia
  • MBS’ vision of expanded Saudi regional influence: start a war next door in Yemen, consolidate power internally, create a diplomatic crisis with Lebanon (forcing Lebanese PM to resign for being too weak on Hezbollah), escalate tensions with Lebanon, and forge new alliances to thwart Iranian Shiite influence.
  • The war in Yemen continues with no resolution in sight; Houthi rebel resilience threatens Hadi’s tenure as Yemen’s President as well as KSA’s campaign to exert regional military dominance.
  • A Saudi led conflict in Lebanon is never a sure thing; just ask the Israeli Defense Force after its 2006 debacle.
  • Iranian backing has seen tactical and strategic military success in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Iran won a proxy fight in Syria simply by ensuring Assad’s survival and Yemen is in shambles while KSA is unable to defeat or effectively counter Iran’s support of the Houthi rebels.
Lebanon
  • Hariri, a pro-Saudi Sunni politician, resigns; Lebanon still has a President but the position is honorific.
  • Hezbollah cannot be controlled or effectively politically muted.
  • Next…proxy if not a hot war.
Syria
  • Ungoverned space.
  • Most significant success is liberating Raqqa from ISIS; caliphate is shrinking, but ideology remains vibrant.
  • Russia involved deeply in an effort to counter U.S. interests, they will be successful.
  • Assad will die an old man…in power.
Turkey
  • A NATO ally…for now. NATO authority could be questioned should Turkey depart; however, NATO survived the departure of France in the late 1960s.
  • Turkey outraged at US backing for YPG’s (People Protection Units) fight against ISIS; Turkey views YPG as a terrorist organization aligned with the PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) which the US considers a terrorist organization.
  • Escalation of diplomatic tension between the US and Turkey threatens the long-standing alliance; the region will benefit if Turkey remains a vibrant member of NATO.
Iran
  • Iran has extensive influence in spreading its interest through proxies.
  • Sanctions have been lifted and they are developing nukes under the JCPOA.
  • The Saudi-Iran influence battle continues with many opportunities to achieve tactical victories and an increased risk of strategic losses on both sides.
  • Iran remains in the catbird seat.